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Anomalies 
Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners 
Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler 
Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that 
most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, 
well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those pref- 
erences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an 
anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize" or if implausible assumptions are 
necessary to explain it within the paradigm. This column will resume, after a 
long rest, the investigation of such anomalies. 
Why study anomalies? What is the purpose of detailed explorations of the 
failures of economic theory? Some people believe that the main goal is to annoy 
dogmatic economists. While conceding the pleasure to be achieved in this vein, 
the investigation of anomalies does have a loftier goal: providing concrete 
evidence that will help develop economic theory. Like a doctor poking around 
for sensitive spots, the point of the exercise is to assist the patient, rather than 
to inflict pain. To this end, it may be useful to revisit occasionally a topic 
previously discussed in this space to see how the patient is doing. In this spirit, 
the first installment of the reborn series returns to the ultimatum game, as 
discussed in the Fall 1988 issue of this journal. Future installments will take on 
new topics, and suggestions are always welcome. Write to Richard Thaler, c/ o 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Sloan School of Management, E52-555, MIT, 
Cambridge, MA 02139, or thaler@mit.edu. 
* Colin Camerer is Axline Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of 
Technology, Pasadena, California. Richard Thaler is H. J. Louis Professor of Eco- 
nomics, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
At the time this was written, Thaler was on leave at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
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Introduction 
The ultimatum game could not be simpler. Two players are allotted a sum 
of money. The first player, now often called the Proposer, offers some portion 
of the money to the second player, called the Responder. If the Responder 
accepts, she gets what was offered, and the Proposer gets the rest. If the 
Responder rejects the offer, both players get nothing. This game first attracted 
attention because the empirical results differed so dramatically from the predic- 
tions of game theory, which assumes self-interest. If both players are income 
maximizers, and Proposers know this, then the Proposer should offer a penny 
(or the smallest unit of currency available), and the Responder should accept. 
Instead, offers typically average about 30-40 percent of the total, with a 50-50 
split often the mode. Offers of less than 20 percent are frequently rejected. 
These facts are not now in question. What remains controversial is how to 
interpret the facts and how best to incorporate what we have learned into a 
more descriptive version of game theory. This column offers our view of the 
current status of this line of inquiry.' 
Anomaly or Artifact? 
When an alleged anomaly emerges, it is good scientific practice to test 
whether it is robust and not an artifact of a particular experimental environ- 
ment. Based on research in the last few years, it seems fair to report that the 
behavior observed in the ultimatum game is quite robust. That is, different 
variables change the average offers and acceptances significantly, but under no 
conditions are very small offers made and accepted. Two efforts along these 
lines deserve special mention. 
First, a question that always arises in experimental research, and especially 
experimental research with anomalous results, is whether the phenomenon is 
simply a function of the relatively small stakes used in the laboratory. This is 
not to say that the stakes used in ultimatum game research have been low. The 
sum to be divided has usually been at least $10 and often as high as $20. 
Nevertheless it is reasonable to wonder what would happen at higher stakes, 
say $100. It is one thing to turn down $2 to punish someone who is keeping $8 
for himself, but will someone be willing to turn down $20 when the other 
player is proposing to keep $80? Decide what you think before reading the 
next paragraph. While forming your expectations, keep in mind that the 
IThis review will be highly selective. For a review of the early literature, see Thaler (1988) in this 
journal. For more details on these and on other bargaining games, see Roth's (1995) excellent 
chapter. 
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Proposers in the high-stakes experiment also should have been forming expec- 
tations. If Proposers felt that Responders would be less likely to reject 10 
percent offers in the $100 game than in the $10 game, then those Proposers 
who were trying to maximize their own income should have decreased their 
(percentage) offers (relative to what they would have offered in a $10 game).2 
Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (in press) got tired of hearing in seminars 
that the ultimatum results would change if the stakes were raised, so they 
invested $5000 in research funds to find out what would happen. They had 50 
pairs play a $100 version of an ultimatum game in two conditions. Some pairs 
played under rules in which chance determined the right to be the Proposer, 
while for the other pairs the outcome of a trivia contest determined the 
Proposer. (In this condition, the wording of the instructions was also changed 
somewhat to use what the authors call the language of exchange.) The experi- 
ment had been run earlier, with the same two conditions, but with a stake of 
$10. This was used as a basis for comparison. The proportions offered in the 
$10 and $100 games turned out to be insignificantly different in both condi- 
tions. The most striking result was the frequency of rejections in the high- 
stakes/ contest condition: three of the four offers of $10 were rejected, and two 
of the five offers of $30 were rejected. These Proposers were undoubtedly 
surprised to discover that Respondents were willing to turn down $10, much 
less $30, rather than accept an "unfair" offer. The results of this expensive 
experiment show that it is safe to go back to more affordable ultimatum 
experiments, since they generate data that are indistinguishable from high- 
stakes data. In fact, the amount at stake alters behavior much less than more 
subtle manipulations, such as the contest/ exchange labeling. 
Another possible artifact is cultural: does the nationality of the subjects 
make a difference? With great care given to issues of comparability, Roth, 
Prasnikar, Zamir, and Okuno-Fujiwara (1991) ran ultimatum games in four 
locations: Jerusalem, Ljubljana (in Slovenia), Pittsburgh and Tokyo. The simi- 
larities were again striking. In all four countries, the modal offers were in the 
range of 40 to 50 percent. Still, there were some intriguing differences. For 
example, Israeli Proposers gave somewhat lower offers (the mode was 40 
percent compared to 50 percent in the United States), and the Israeli Respon- 
ders were willing to take lower offers. It is tempting, but premature, to 
attribute this difference in behavior to what has to be the highest per capita 
concentration of game theorists in the world. Still, 40 percent is still a long way 
from epsilon, so even in Israel we may need to improve the predictive power of 
game theory. 
2However, if Proposers are risk averse, then the increase in stakes may induce them to be cautious. 
At a conference a few years ago, several leading game theorists and experimentalists introspected 
about how they would play a $1 million version of the ultimatum game. Most of the participants 
settled on an offer in the range of $50,000 to $100,000, but Robert Aumann insisted that he would 
offer half the pot, purely out of risk aversion. He pointed out that you never know what lunatic you 
might be paired up with. 
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Information 
If we accept that the basic empirical data on the ultimatum game is 
capturing a real phenomenon, then we can ask what is going on. One way of 
getting some insights into the causes for the behaviors we observe is to 
manipulate the information available to the two players and see what happens. 
Varying information may tell us why Responders reject low offers in the 
standard game. Several investigators have taken this tack, and we summarize 
just one effort here.3 
If Responders reject small offers because they deem them to be unfair, 
then their willingness to reject should depend on what they think the Proposers 
are keeping for themselves. To investigate this, Kagel, Kim, and Moser (in 
press) use a design in which players divided 100 chips. The experiments 
manipulate both the value of the chips (each chip is worth either 10 cents or 30 
cents) and who knows what about relative values. Players always know their 
own chip valuation, but in some conditions they do not know the other player's 
value. Who knows what is common knowledge. There are ten repetitions of the 
game, always under the same informational conditions, against ten different 
opponents. (One round is picked at random to count for the actual monetary 
payoff.) 
In the case when both players have the same payoff, and this in known to 
both, we have a standard ultimatum game, and offers tend to converge to 50 
percent. In the more interesting cases, information is asymmetric. For example, 
when the Proposer knows that the chips are worth 30 cents to him but only 
worth 10 cents to the Responder, an equal division of money would imply an 
offer of 75 percent of the chips to the Responder. However, if only the 
Proposer knows that he has the higher valuation, he can offer 50 percent and 
still seem fair. Do Proposers want to be fair or seem fair? The data imply that 
the appearance of fairness is enough; offers in this condition are close to 50 
percent, and since Responders have no reason to think that the 50 percent 
offer is anything but fair, rejections are rare. These results serve as an impor- 
tant reminder that self-interested behavior is alive and well, even in ultimatum 
games. 
Compare the previous situation to one where only the Responder knows 
that she has the lower value. Here offers start out (in the early rounds) around 
40 percent and drift up to about 50 percent in reaction to rejection rates of 34 
percent. In this case, the Responders are upset at getting only one quarter of 
the pie, and Proposers gradually react to that anger. When both players know 
that the Proposer has the higher value, offers start out at 50 percent of the 
chips, but very high rejection rates (50 percent in period 1) drive up the offers 
3Two other noteworthy studies along these lines are Croson (1994) and Mitzkewitz and Nagel 
(1993). 
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to 64 percent in period 10. When the Responder has the higher rate, and only 
she knows, offers are only about 30 percent. 
Context Effects 
Subjects in interpersonal experiments like the ultimatum game may be 
influenced by all kinds of factors: the wording of the instructions, the identity of 
the experimenters, whether the experiment is thought to be "economics" or 
"psychology," and so forth. This means that initial results should be inter- 
preted cautiously. At this point in ultimatum game research, enough indepen- 
dent studies have now been carried out with original designs and instructions 
to be confident that the basic phenomena are robust. The closely related 
"dictator game," however, turns out to be very sensitive to design issues. 
In the dictator game, the first player, called the Allocator, makes a unilat- 
eral decision regarding the split of the pie. The second player, the Recipient, 
must accept the result. The original dictator game experiments by Kahneman 
et al. (1986b) and Forsythe et al. (1994) were used to help determine the extent 
to which generous offers in ultimatum games occurred because Proposers were 
fair-minded or because Proposers feared having low offers rejected. The an- 
swer was this: both factors mattered. Offers in the dictator game are lower than 
in ultimatum games, but (in most variations) are still positive. 
Hoffman et al. (1994a, b) used several different versions of the dictator 
game to help refine this conclusion. They ran a set of experiments where the 
following six components of the design were varied, one at a time, in an 
attempt to manipulate the perceived "social distance" between Allocators and 
Recipients. First, the instructors used by other researchers in which subjects 
were told that their task was "to divide $10" were altered. In the new 
instructions the Allocator was called a "seller" and was told he could set a price 
that divided surplus between himself and a buyer (Recipient) purchasing an 
unidentified object. Second, most allocators received an envelope containing 
ten $1 bills and ten slips of paper and were told to put some combination of ten 
bills and slips of paper in an envelope to be given to the Recipient. Third, two 
of the Allocators received an envelope that contained only slips of paper. Thus, 
a Recipient would not know whether a zero offer was intentional or the result 
of getting one of the "null" envelopes. Fourth, the role of the Allocator was 
sometimes determined by winning a trivia contest rather than by random 
assignment. Fifth, the subjects were assured, using a complicated procedure, 
that the experimenter would not know the actions of any individual subject. 
Sixth, one subject was chosen to be a paid monitor and was paid $10 for 
doing so. 
When all six of these conditions were in force, including choosing the 
Allocator by contest, about 65 percent of the subjects kept all the money for 
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themselves, compared to less than 20 percent in one experiment by Forsythe 
et al. (1994). However, no single factor of the six seemed crucial; each change 
in design had an effect. The authors concluded that as the "social distance" 
between the Allocator and the Recipient grows, the offers shrink. We agree and 
offer some additional thoughts along these lines in the commentary. 
Theory 
How can the empirical results obtained so far be used to develop a more 
descriptive version of bargaining theory? Theorists need to keep their eyes on 
the behavior of both players. Proposers seem to have some willingness to give 
away some of their new-found money, even in dictator games, but that willing- 
ness seems to be context dependent. In ultimatum games Proposers act very 
much like sophisticated profit maximizers. They are sophisticated because they 
realize that very unfair offers are likely to be rejected by the Responders. In the 
ultimatum game, it is the Responders' behavior that presents the trickier (and 
more interesting) modeling problems. We will discuss three efforts at tackling 
this theoretical question. 
In Bolton's (1991) model, players maximize utilities that include social 
comparison. Responders have a utility function with two arguments U(Xr, Xr/ 
xp): xr is the absolute amount received by the Responder, and Xr/ Xp is the 
ratio of the Responder's share to the Proposer's share. (The index is set to 1 if 
both players get nothing.) A subject who rejects $2 out of $10, for example, 
simply has u($2, 0.25) < u(0, 1); she is willing to give up $2 to avoid worsening 
her relative standing. Bolton then employs several auxiliary assumptions about 
the utility function. For example, he assumes that if a player gets less than half 
(xr < xp), then utility is increasing in relative comparison; this implies an envy 
in which I prefer to get $2 from a $5 pie, leaving you $3, than to get $2 from a 
$10 pie. But if a player gets more than half, then she is satisfied in relative 
standing, and her utility can only be increased if she earns more. Combining 
these assumptions predicts an asymmetric attitude toward fairness in which 
relative comparison matters a lot when I feel unfairly treated, but matters very 
little when I feel fairly treated. 
Formal models like this are extremely useful, but Bolton's has an impor- 
tant shortcoming. His relative comparison model does not distinguish a distaste 
for uneven allocations per se from a willingness to punish a player who has 
behaved unfairly by making an uneven offer. In Bolton's model, a Responder is 
as likely to reject a very small offer if the offer was selected by the Proposer or if 
the offer was selected at random. This is true because the measure of social 
comparison (the ratio of the payoffs) is the same in either case. But Blount (in 
press) finds that subjects are more likely to accept small (uneven) offers if they 
come from a random device than if they are chosen by the Proposer. People are 
punishing unfairness, not rejecting inequality. 
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Rabin (1993) offers a more sophisticated model of fairness inspired by 
experimental findings in social psychology. In Rabin's model, agents in 
normal-form games differentiate between an intentional act of meanness, which 
they will punish, and an inadvertently mean act, which they will tolerate. Rabin 
introduces a new equilibrium concept, called a "fairness equilibrium." To see 
how it works, consider the standard prisoner's dilemma game in which the 
Nash equilibrium is for both players to defect. This outcome is also a fairness 
equilibrium, since both players are punishing the other's uncooperative action. 
However, there is an additional fairness equilibrium: cooperate-cooperate. This 
is a fairness equilibrium because both players are willing to sacrifice something 
to reward the other player's cooperative act. 
A model like Rabin's (1993) adds several interesting features to simple 
relative comparison. It can accommodate both positive altruism (helping friends 
through mechanisms like gift exchange and trust) and negative envy (punish- 
ing enemies at a cost to oneself). By focusing on the importance of how each 
player views the intentions of the other, such a perspective can explain why 
Responders reject unequal offers made by Proposers, but accept equally uneven 
offers made by a computer. The demonstration that intentions matter paves the 
way to incorporate what psychologists call "attributions" into economic analysis.4 
Finally, the reciprocal fairness view allows consideration of the set of available 
choices a player has, since this helps in judging intentions. We conjecture that 
Respondents will be more likely to accept the short end of an (8, 2) offer when 
the Proposer was choosing between this allocation and one that was worse (such 
as (10, 0)) than in a situation where the Proposer could have chosen the even 
split (5, 5). 
A third theoretical approach explains ultimatum outcomes as the combina- 
tion of initial distributions of offer and rejection thresholds-which may -vary 
across subject pools, contexts, and so on-and simple evolutionary or reinforce- 
ment models of learning (Roth and Erev, in press; Binmore and Samuelson, 
1993). In these models, unlike Bolton's and Rabin's, subjects have no underly- 
ing concern for other's payoffs. Proposers learn to make generous offers 
because they discover that Responders reject stingy offers. Responders also 
learn to accept low offers, but more slowly, since the cost to them of rejecting a 
small offer is less than the cost to the Proposer of having a small offer turned 
down. Models of learning and evolution are important in economics. But these 
models cannot easily explain why we see both fair offers (predicted to result 
from learning) and rejections of unfair offers (predicted to disappear with 
learning) in one-shot and repeated laboratory trials. 
4Attribution theory describes how people attribute cause to events and how attributions influence 
reactions to events. For example, "procedural justice" researchers have found that the way in 
which job layoffs were determined by firms and communicated to workers makes a substantial 
difference in how both laid-off "victims" and retained "survivors" behave toward the firm 
afterward. 
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These three kinds of models represent a good start. However, none can 
explain the dictator game data, nor the information-varying experiments. 
There is more to do and plenty of observations to work with. 
Commentary: The Economics of Manners 
Why does game theory fail as a predictive model in ultimatum and dictator 
games? These games are so simple that we can rule out rationality as the source 
of any problem, so the difficulty presumably has something to do with the 
assumption that the players are income maximizers. One obvious strategy in 
trying to fix up economic theory to deal with this problem is to allow for some 
kind of altruistic utility function, where the utility to one player depends on the 
payoffs to other players. But this formulation presents two immediate prob- 
lems. First, based on behavior displayed in these experiments, it is not possible 
to say whether the average participant puts a positive or negative value on the 
other subject's payoffs! In dictator games, the Allocators act as if they put a 
positive value on the Recipient's payoff. But in the ultimatum game, Respon- 
ders who receive small offers turn them down, an act that implies a negative 
relationship between their own utility and the other player's payoffs. Appar- 
ently, a player does not care about the other's welfare per se, but desires some 
kind of equity in the context of this particular interaction. We conclude that the 
outcomes of ultimatum, dictatorship and many other bargaining games have 
more to do with manners than altruism. 
Consider first the simple dictator game. Subjects are handed $10 in manna 
from experimental heaven and asked whether they would like to share some of 
it with a stranger who is in the same room. Many do. However, if the first 
player is made to feel as if he earned the right to the $10, or the relationship 
with the other player is made less personal, then sharing shrinks. Etiquette may 
require you to share a windfall with a friend, but it certainly does not require 
you to give up some of your hard-earned year-end bonus to a stranger.5 
In the ultimatum game, the Responder is primarily reacting to the man- 
ners of the first player. The Responders are willing to turn down rude offers, 
even at a cost to themselves. Rabin's (1993) model, which captures this notion 
neatly, incorporates etiquette into economics. Though most economists have 
ignored manners and etiquette in their research-and, some would say, in 
their behavior- such factors can be very important. The perceived norms of 
fairness, investigated by Kahneman et al. (1986a), can be thought of as rules of 
5In some hotels, the person who cleans the room signs a card, presumably to increase tips. We 
suspect this ploy works. If so, perhaps offers in the dictator game would increase if the Allocator 
knew that the Responder's name was Pat (though not which Pat). This is related to the well-known 
phenomenon that people are willing to pay more to save a "known" life than a statistical life. At the 
societal level, leaving a girl in a well to die is beyond rude, but doing nothing about an unsafe 
highway is acceptable behavior. 
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polite business practice. It is rude to raise the price of snow shovels after a 
blizzard, and firms who are in business for the long term have the good sense 
to eschew short-run profits to protect the relationship they have built up with 
their customers. Similarly, firms that treat their workers fairly (politely) will be 
rewarded by greater effort as some gift-exchange and efficiency wage models 
predict (for example, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In a laboratory experiment, 
Fehr et al. (1993) find that "firms" who pay more than they have to are 
rewarded with voluntary effort contributions by their "workers." 
A good general theory of fairness predicts that fair-minded players behave 
self-interestedly in some situations. Two experiments show that competition can 
push ultimatum offers closer to zero, in ways consistent with fairness. Schotter 
et al. (1994) created competition among Proposers. Eight Proposers made 
offers in a first stage. The four who earned the most in the first-stage game 
could then play a second-stage game (with a different player). Sensible fairness 
theories would say that Proposers now have an excuse for making low 
offers-they must compete for the right to play again -so low offers are not as 
unfair, and Responders will accept them more readily. That is what happened. 
Another study in Roth, Prasnikar, Zamir, and Okuno-Fujiwara (1991) used 
market-like games to create competition among Responders. Nine Responders 
simultaneously announced the lowest offers they would take from a single 
Proposer, who then consummated the deal with the Responder offering the 
best terms. The Responders' minimum acceptable offers started around typical 
ultimatum levels, averaging 30 percent, but within ten rounds most players 
were willing to take 10 percent or less. Again, a sensible model of fairness can 
explain this reduction in the willingness to punish unfair offers. First, in this 
game Responders do not have the power to punish single-handed an unfair 
Proposer. Even if I refuse an offer of 15 percent, the Proposer does not suffer if 
you are willing to accept even less. Second, since the Proposer does not suggest 
an offer, there is no attribution of unfairness associated with a low offer. In this 
game, the Proposer is merely accepting the best deal available, and there is 
nothing unfair in that. Indeed, Responders may even feel that it is other 
Responders (rather than the Proposer) who are misbehaving by accepting such 
low offers, and they may decide to punish that behavior by accepting even less. 
An ultimatum study with children further illustrates our idea about man- 
ners. Playing ultimatum games for a dollar or for a pile of M & M candies, 
kindergartners accepted minimal offers (one penny or one M & M) about 70 
percent of the time, compared to about 40 percent for third- and sixth-graders 
(Murnighan and Saxon, 1994) and probably much less for the typical college 
student subjects. Besides discovering the group of Respondent subjects who 
behave most like pure income maximizers-kindergartners-the study shows 
that perhaps the tendency to reject insulting low offers is learned, as manners 
are. 
6Kahneman et al. (1986a) referred to this pressure as the need to "stay in business." 
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Our goal in stressing manners is to distinguish this explanation from one 
based on altruism or other interdependent utility functions. Our view is similar 
to that of Hoffman et al. (1994a, b), who prefer to describe the behavior as a 
manifestation of rules of reciprocity that people learn in everyday life. In 
repeated encounters, it is rational to treat others fairly and punish those who 
behave unfairly, because long-run concerns outweigh the short-run costs. Of 
course, there are no long-run concerns in a one-shot ultimatum game, but 
Hoffman et al. (1994a, b, forthcoming) argue that subjects in such experimental 
settings cannot curb their repeated-game impulses. We find this view troubling 
for experimentalists. It says that subjects cannot accept a situation as being one 
shot, even when there is $100 at stake. We prefer to think that people have 
simply adopted rules of behavior they think apply to themselves and others, 
regardless of the situation. They leave tips in restaurants that they never expect 
to visit again not because they believe this is really a repeated game, but 
because it would be rude to do otherwise. 
We are excited by Rabin's attempt to incorporate fairness (or manners) 
into game theory. His model takes the experimental evidence seriously and 
tries to come to grips with it, rather than making excuses for it. We hope other 
game theorists will follow Rabin's lead and continue to develop models of how 
real people interact. And if a theorist is wondering how someone will play 
a certain game and no experiment has been run, we suggest asking Miss 
Manners. 
* We would like to thank Ernst Fehr, John Kagel, Al Roth, Vernon Smith, Richard 
Zeckhauser and, as always, the editors for helpful comments. None should be blamed if we 
have been unfair or rude. 
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